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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, Taiwan officially adopted the independent director
mechanism for the purpose of promoting corporate governance and
improving corporate health. 1 More than ten years have passed since
this change to the Securities Exchange Act (“SEA”) and yet some
doubts still persist in public at large regarding the roles and
functions of independent directors. Paragraph 1, Article 14-2 of the
SEA provides that:

Professor of Law, National Taipei University.
1 The introduction of independent directors in Taiwan intends to resolve statutory
supervisors’ failure and effectively monitor board of directors. For relevant discussions on
introduction of independent directors in Taiwan, please see Hsin-Ti Chang, Yu-Hsin Lin &
Ying-Hsin Tsai, From Double Board to Unitary Board System—Independent Directors
and Corporate Governance Reform in Taiwan, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR IN ASIA-A
HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH 241-245 (Dan W. Puchniak,
Harald Baum & Luke Nottage eds., 2017).
†
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[a] company that has issued stock in accordance with
this Act may appoint independent directors in
accordance with its articles of incorporation. The
Competent Authority, however, shall, as necessary,
in view of the company’s scale, shareholder structure,
type of operations, and other essential factors, require
it to appoint independent directors, not less than two
in number and not less than one-fifth of the total
number of directors. 2
The competent authority, Financial Supervisory Commission
(“FSC”), compulsorily requires all non-financial Taiwan Stock
Exchange (“TWSE”)-Listed and Taipei Exchange(“TPEx”)-Listed
companies along with firms in the financial industry to appoint
independent directors at a number of no fewer than two or a ratio of
not less than one-fifth the total number of directors on the board. 3
For traded companies on the non-financial Emerging Stock Board
(“ESB”), 4 such compulsory appointment of independent directors
shall be applied no later than January 1st, 2020. 5
A 2017 study reveals that as of October 2014, 35.87% of all
companies among TWSE/TPEx-Listed companies had two
independent directors on their boards and 29.43% had three
independent directors. 6 The SEA requires that boards of public
companies in Taiwan have a minimum of five directors. 7 Therefore,
Paragraph 1, Article 14-2 of the Securities Exchange Act. See SEC. EXCHANGE ACT
(June 21, 2019) (Taiwan), FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU ( 全 國 法 規 資 料 庫 ) [Laws and
Regulations
Database
of
the
Republic
of
China],
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=G0400001
[https://perma.cc/J5QS-CR4P].
3 TPEx-Listed companies are originally known as Over-The-Counter-Traded
companies in Taiwan.
4 In addition to the Main Board, Taipei Exchange (the OTC market) established an
Emerging Stock Board in 2013. For more details about the Emerging Stock Board, see
TAIPEI EXCHANGE, LISTING REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES,
https://www.tpex.org.tw/web/service/sotck_info/feature/promote_issuer.php?l=en-us
[https://perma.cc/MC88-T9AS] (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
5 FIN. SUPERVISORY COMMISSION, ORDER NO. FINANCIAL-SUPERVISOR-SECURITIES-I1070345233 (Dec. 19, 2018), https://eng.selaw.com.tw/LetterContent.aspx?Soid=177
[https://perma.cc/HRU3-46RT].
6 CHANG, LIN & TSAI, supra note 1, at 251.
7 Article 26-3 of the Securities Exchange Act provides that “The board of directors
of a company that has issued stock in accordance with the Act may not number less than
five persons . . . “ See SEC. EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 26-3.
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based on the above numbers, we can estimate that of all the
companies listed on the TWSE/TPEx, few of the boards have a
majority of independent directors. In fact, according to the
information disclosed on the Market Observation Post System
(“MOPS”) of the TWSE, as of December 2017, out of a group of
919 TWSE-Listed companies indicating two or more independent
directors on their boards, 31 of them had four independent directors,
five had five independent directors, and only two had six
independent directors. 8 For those companies with more than four
independent directors, only 11 of them had a majority of
independent directors on the board, 9 which is a mere 1.2% of all
TWSE-Listed companies. Therefore, the crux of the matter is how
independent directors in Taiwan, who are in the minority on most
boards, can perform their tasks well in this challenging environment
and achieve the aim of promoting corporate governance and
improving corporate health.
Randy J. Holland, former Justice of Delaware Supreme
Court, has pointed out that independent directors have two major
functions: to make inquiries and to veto. 10 Under the current
independent director mechanism in Taiwan, despite the difficulties
faced by independent directors for taking the lead in directing or
channeling the results of board decisions, they can still play an
important role in monitoring activities and delivering outside
independent opinions. The performance of these activities, however,
is under pressure from additional challenges facing independent
directors—Namely, independent directors are subject to limited
information and restraints on time, along with an excessive
dependence on the provision of information by company
management. This reliance on information controlled by company
management has led some to speculate that outside directors merely
receive selective information that would support management’s
desired position on any given matter. As a result, instead of acting
as a check against potential managerial indiscretion, “[o]utside
directors may see major issues confronting the corporation through
8 https://mops.twse.com.tw/mops/web/index
[https://perma.cc/5WK2-8H3G]
(Market Observation Post System 公開資訊觀測站, Chinese).
9 https://mops.twse.com.tw/mops/web/t93sb05
[https://perma.cc/UZU4-MY4P]
(Market Observation Post System 公開資訊觀測站, Chinese).
10 Randy J. Holland spoke at the meeting of Taiwan Academy of Banking and
Finance on December 3rd, 2008.
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management’s eyes.” 11 Therefore, if they are to fulfill their
fiduciary duties, then independent directors need to make inquiries,
deliver contrary opinions, assert reservations, or act as a veto on the
board.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the monitoring
activity provided for by independent directors in Taiwan, this study
reviews dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors.
Dissenting opinion for the purposes of this paper means an opinion
of reservation or a veto delivered by an independent director on the
board or committee and disclosed on the MOPS in accordance to the
relevant laws and regulations. This empirical study analyzes the
following issues:(1) the number and distribution of dissenting
opinions delivered by independent directors; (2) the reasons for such
dissenting opinions; (3) the responses by boards for which
independent directors delivered dissenting opinions; and, (4) the
possible correlation between the delivery of dissenting opinions by
independent directors and their re-elections.
There exists, however, certain unavoidable limitations to this
empirical study. First, in practice, it is common practice in Taiwan
to have an “informal meeting” to exchange opinions before the
formal board meeting, but such informal meetings will not have
formal minutes and are not required by law to publish dissenting
opinions, if any, by independent directors. Second, under the
existing laws and regulations, dissenting opinions delivered on an
audit committee are not subject to the disclosure requirement.
Hence, the dissenting opinions collected in this paper are limited to
those disclosed on the MOPS, and thus, there will likely be fewer
dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors reviewed in
this paper than those that may have actually been delivered on
various occasions.
The remaining parts of this paper are as follows: Part II
introduces the relevant laws and regulations governing the
disclosure of dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors
in Taiwan. Part III presents the results derived from this empirical
study. Part IV assesses certain implications garnered from the
results of this empirical study, including insufficiencies with respect
to information or disclosures. Part V provides concluding remarks.
11 Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 914 (1995-1996).
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II. RELEVANT REGULATIONS IN TAIWAN ON THE
DISSENTING OPINIONS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
Under current Taiwanese law, independent directors are
seated on company boards and audit committees, but their seats on
remuneration committees are, to an extent, optional. Article 193 of
The Company Act provides that:
[(Paragraph 1) t]he Board of Directors, in conducting
business, shall act in accordance with laws and
ordinances, the Articles of Incorporation, and the
resolutions adopted at the meetings of shareholders.
[Paragraph 2] Where any resolution adopted by the
Board of Directors contravenes the preceding
Paragraph, thereby causing loss or damage to the
company, all directors taking part in the adoption of
such resolution shall be liable to compensate the
company for such loss or damage; however, those
directors whose dissenting opinion appears on record
or is expressed in writing shall be exempted from
liability. 12
Accordingly, for an independent director to be exempted
from liability, his/her dissenting opinion should either be expressed
in writing or appear on record. In addition, Paragraph 1, Article 143 of the SEA sets forth that when a company has selected
independent directors, certain matters, such as the adoption or
amendment of an internal control system; the adoption or
amendment of procedures for handling financial or operational
actions of material significance; a matter bearing on the personal
interest of a director or supervisor; a material asset or derivatives
transaction; a material monetary loans, endorsements or provisions
of guarantee; the offerings, issuance, or private placements of any
equity-type security; the hiring or dismissal of an attesting CPA, the
compensation given thereto; and, the appointment or discharge of a
Article 193 of the Company Act. See COMPANY ACT art. 193 (Aug. 1, 2018)
(Taiwan), FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database
of the Republic of China],
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=J0080001
[https://perma.cc/HJ2H-5HZ8] [hereinafter Audit Committee Regulations]
12
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financial, accounting, or internal auditing officer, etc. shall be
submitted to the board of directors for approval by resolution unless
approval has already been obtained from the FSC. When an
independent director has a dissenting opinion on any such matters, it
shall be noted in the minutes of the directors meeting. 13
Moreover, every independent director on the board
automatically becomes a member of the audit committee under the
SEA (namely, the audit committee shall be composed of the entire
number of independent directors). 14 However, the authority of the
audit committee on critical issues is weak as a result of the board’s
ability to, in most cases, usurp its authority. Specifically, in most
cases, a board has the power to overrule decisions of an audit
committee by passage of a resolution supported by two-thirds or
more of all directors. 15 In such cases, where an audit committee’s
decision has been essentially disregarded, the only option available
to the committee is to record the board’s reversal of its decision in
the board-meeting minutes with the hope that public scrutiny will
offer some sanction. 16 Paragraph 1, Article 10 of the Regulations
Governing the Exercise of Powers by Audit Committees of Public
Companies provides that:
[d]iscussion at an audit committee meeting shall be
included in the meeting minutes, which shall
faithfully record the following: . . . 7. Agenda items:
Article 14-3 of the SEA provides that “When a company has selected independent
directors as set forth in paragraph 1 of the preceding article, then the following matters
shall be submitted to the board of directors for approval by resolution unless approval has
been obtained from the Competent Authority; and when an independent director has a
dissenting opinion or reservation opinion, it shall be noted in the minutes of the directors
meeting: 1. Adoption or amendment of an internal control system pursuant to Article 14-1;
2. Adoption or amendment, pursuant to Article 36-1, of handling procedures for financial
or operational actions of material significance, such as acquisition or disposal of assets,
derivatives trading, extension of monetary loans to others, or endorsements or guarantees
for others; 3. A matter bearing on the personal interest of a director or supervisor; 4. A
material asset or derivatives transaction; 5. A material monetary loan, endorsement, or
provision of guarantee; 6. The offering, issuance, or private placement of any equity-type
securities; 7. The hiring or dismissal of an attesting CPA, or the compensation given
thereto; 8. The appointment or discharge of a financial, accounting, or internal auditing
officer; 9. Any other material matter so required by the Competent Authority.” See SEC.
EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 14-3.
14 SEC. EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 14-4.
15 SEC. EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 14-5.
16 CHANG, LIN & TSAI, supra note 1, at 257-258.
13
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resolution method and result of each proposal;
summary of the comments made by the independent
director members on the audit committee . . . ; the
name of any independent director member possibly
having an interest relationship . . . ; and any
objections or reservations expressed at the meeting. 17
Independent director membership on remuneration
committees, under Taiwan laws, is not fully compulsory. Paragraph
3, Article 8 of the Regulations Governing the Appointment and
Exercise of Powers by the Remuneration Committee of a Company
Whose Stock is Listed on the Stock Exchange or Traded Over the
Counter (“Remuneration Committee Regulations”) provides that:
[w]hen a company has selected independent directors
in accordance with the SEA, at least one independent
director shall participate on the remuneration
committee, although other qualified independent
experts might also be the members of remuneration
committee, and the entire membership shall
unanimously elect the independent director to serve
as the convener and meeting chair.” 18

17 See Gongkai Faxing Gongsi Shenji Weiyuanhui Xingshi Zhiquan Banfa (公開發行
公司審計委員會行使職權辦法) [Regulations Governing the Exercise of Powers by Audit
Committees of Public Companies] art. 10 (promulgated by Fin. Supervisory Commission,
R.O.C (Taiwan), Mar. 28, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007; rev’d by Fin. Supervisory
Commission,
R.O.C
(Taiwan),
July
28,
2017),
https://law.fsc.gov.tw/law/EngLawContent.aspx?lan=E&id=2072 [https://perma.cc/H3B4MFD7]
18 The qualifications for independent experts on the remuneration committee are
exactly the same as those for independent directors set forth in the Articles 2 and 3 of the
Regulations Governing Appointment of Independent Directors and Compliance Matters for
Public Companies. See REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPOINTMENT AND EXERCISE OF
POWERS BY THE REMUNERATION COMMITTEE OF A COMPANY WHOSE STOCK IS LISTED ON
THE STOCK EXCHANGE OR TRADED OVER THE COUNTER (股票上市或於證券商營業處所買
賣公司薪資報酬委員會設置及行使職權辦法) art. 5 & art 6 (Aug. 27, 2015) (Taiwan),
FAWUBU FAGUI ZILIAOKU (全國法規資料庫) [Laws and Regulations Database of the
Republic of China],
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=G0400149
[https://perma.cc/KU8K-3B5E] [hereinafter Remuneration Committee Regulations].
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General practice for most TWSE/TPEx-Listed companies is
for all independent directors to be members of the remuneration
committee.
Decisions of remuneration committees, like those of audit
committees, cannot be considered final as they are subject to being
overruled by the board via the consent of a majority of the directors
in attendance at a meeting attended by two-thirds or more of the
entire board. 19 If the remuneration decisions passed by the board of
directors exceed a recommendation by the remuneration committee,
then the circumstances and causes for the difference shall be
specified in the board meeting minutes, and shall be publicly
announced and reported on the information reporting website
designated by the competent authority within two days from the
date of passage by the board of directors. 20 Furthermore, Article 10
of the Remuneration Committee Regulations sets forth that:
[m]inutes shall be prepared of the discussions at the
remuneration committee, and the minutes shall
record the matters listed below in a detailed and
accurate manner: . . . 7. Agenda items: the resolution
method and outcome of each motion, and any
objections or reservations expressed by any
committee member . . . If with respect to any
resolution of the remuneration committee, any
member has a dissenting or reservation opinion that
is on record or stated in a written statement, the
opinion shall be stated in the meeting minutes, and
additionally, within two days counting inclusively
from the date of occurrence, shall be publicly
disclosed and reported on the information reporting
website designated by the competent authority. 21
To sum up, under Taiwan’s existing laws and regulations,
only the dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors on
the board and/or by independent experts on the remuneration
committee must be reported and disclosed on the MOPS. The
dissenting opinions delivered on the audit committee are not subject
19
20
21

Id.
REMUNERATION COMMITTEE REGULATIONS, supra note 18, at art. 7 §§5-6.
REMUNERATION COMMITTEE REGULATIONS, supra note 18, at art. 10.
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to such a disclosure requirement due to the high sensitivity and
confidential nature of matters of audit committee meetings. In light
of this condition, the dissenting opinions delivered by independent
directors or independent experts on company boards and/or
remuneration committees are selected as the focus for this empirical
study.

III. THE RESULTS OF THIS EMPIRICAL STUDY
This empirical study surveys the dissenting opinions
delivered by independent directors of all TWSE and TPEx-Listed,
including ESB-Traded companies, and disclosed on the MOPS for a
five-year period, from 2013 to 2017. Since there is no category for
dissenting opinions of independent directors on the MOPS, this
study employed keywords (“independent director”, “dissenting
opinion”, “reservation opinion”, “veto”, or “different opinion”) to
capture the relevant data on the MOPS website. For purposes of
calculation in this study, it should be noted that multiple opinions
delivered by the same independent director in a single board
meeting could be assessed as separate instances, such as an
independent director being counted as delivering two dissenting
opinions for a single board meeting when these opinions were for
two separate agenda items. Similarly, two individual independent
directors that have dissenting opinions for the same agenda item at
the same board meeting will also be counted as having two
dissenting opinions, and so on. Additionally, dissenting opinions
delivered by independent experts were also included in the count
due to the fact that the legal qualifications for an independent expert
on a remuneration committee are exactly the same as those of an
independent director.
A. Number of Independent Director Dissenting Opinions
During the five-year period of this study from 2013 to 2017,
there are 86 dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors
for TWSE-Listed Companies, 62 for TPEx-Listed companies, and
13 for ESB-Traded companies. The distribution by different years
and types of companies is indicated by Table 1 and Chart 1 below.
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Table 1: The Number and Distribution of Dissenting Opinions of
Independent Directors

Year

2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Total

TWSE-Listed

TPEx-Listed

ESB-Traded

No. of dissenting
opinions of ID/
total no. of TWSEListed
companies 22

No. of dissenting
opinions of ID/
total
no.
of
TPEx-Listed
companies 23

No. of dissenting
opinions of ID/
total no. of ESBTraded
companies 24

6 / 838
0 / 854
12 / 874
22 / 892
46 / 907
86

10 / 658
6 / 685
2 / 712
19 / 732
25 / 744
62

0 / 261
1 / 284
5 / 284
3 / 271
4 / 274
13

Total

16
7
19
44
75
161

Chart 1: The Distribution of Dissenting Opinions of Independent
Directors

TWSE-Listed

TPEx-Listed

ESB-Traded

22 TAIWAN STOCK EXCHANGE, SUMMARY DATA OF STOCK MARKET (BY YEAR)
ANNUAL STATISTICS,
https://www.twse.com.tw/en/statistics/statisticsList?type=07&subType=232
[https://perma.cc/T4XA-NYV9] (last visited Apr. 26, 2018).
23 TAIPEI EXCHANGE, HISTORICAL DATA AND STATISTICS FOR TPEX LISTED STOCKS,
https://www.tpex.org.tw/web/stock/statistics/monthly/monthly_rpt_mkt_info_02.php?l=enus [https://perma.cc/CK9T-BQAX] (last visited Apr. 26, 2018).
24 TAIPEI
EXCHANGE,
INDICATORS
OF
TPEX,
https://www.tpex.org.tw/web/bulletin/statistics/statistics.php?l=en-us
[https://perma.cc/J3J8-MLU3] (last visited Apr. 26, 2018).
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First, with respect to the numeric data, the number of
dissenting opinions over the five-year period was distributed across
50 different companies. 25 Among these 50 companies, 23 were
TWSE-Listed, 18 TPEx-Listed, and 9 ESB-Traded. 26
Second, with respect to the diachronic data as illustrated by
the timeline for Figure 1, the incidence of dissenting opinions
delivered by independent directors went up in each ensuing year
(except for 2014) for all TWSE/TPEx-Listed and ESB-Traded
companies, with dramatic upticks in both 2016 and 2017 for
TWSE/TPEx-Listed companies. This increase could be indicative
of increased awareness by independent directors of their fiduciary
duty as well as their liabilities therefrom.
Third, with respect to company type, independent directors
in the TPEx-Listed companies delivered more dissenting opinions
than in the TWSE-Listed companies at the early stage of the fiveyear period, such as 2013 and 2014. This can be explained by the
practice for multiple independent directors in a TPEx-Listed
company to usually deliver their dissenting opinions in collective
actions, for example, three independent directors registering
opposition to the same single agenda item would count for three
different dissent opinions, making the overall number of dissenting
opinions statistically higher.
In recent years, however, the
dissenting opinions for independent directors of TWSE-Listed
Companies were more than those of TPEx-Listed companies both in
terms of instance and ratio. For example, as illustrated in Table 1,
the ratio between the number of dissenting opinions of independent
directors and the total number of TWSE-Listed companies was 2.5%
(22/892) in 2016 and 5% (46/907) in 2017 respectively; while such
ratio was 2.5% (19/732) and 3.4% (25/744) for TPEx-Listed
companies and 1.1% (3/271) and 1.5% (4/274) for ESB-Traded
companies. Therefore, we can infer that independent directors in
the TWSE-Listed companies became more active in delivering their
dissenting opinions in recent years.

25 The average number of all TWSE/TPEx-Listed and ESB-Traded companies during
the five-year period was 1855.
26 See infra Appendix pp. 26-49.
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The Numbers of Dissenting Opinions Delivered by
Independent Directors
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Figure 1: The Number of Dissenting Opinions Delivered by Independent
Directors.

Lastly, the report of the Budget Center of Taiwan’s
Legislative Yuan indicated that as of July 2017 there was a total of
2391 independent directors for all TWSE-Listed and 1832
independent directors for all TPEx-Listed companies. 27 Among the
total 4223 independent directors in both TWSE/TPEx-Listed
companies, only 48 independent directors accounted for the 71
dissenting opinions delivered in 2017. 28 That makes for a ratio of
1.1% (48/4223), which means that for every 100 independent
directors only 1.1 delivered dissenting opinions. Based on this data,
the delivery of a dissenting opinion by an independent director in
Taiwan can still be considered a novelty.

27 Lin Tengyao (林騰鷂), Xieren Zhengwuguan Buyi Ren Dudong (卸任政務官不宜
任 獨 董 ) [Retired Board Directors Shall Not Be Independent Directors],
CHINATIMES.COM ( 中 時 電 子 報 ) (Apr. 9, 2018, 04:11 AM),
https://www.chinatimes.com/cn/newspapers/20180409000630-260109?chdtv
[https://perma.cc/D55Q-6C6X].
28 See infra Appendix.
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B. Reasons for Independent Director Dissenting Opinions
The empirical data assessed in this study demonstrates a
diverse variety of reasons for dissenting opinions delivered by
independent directors as a result of the array of complicated
company management and supervision structures. Evidence for this
came, for example, from dissenting opinions surrounding issues
such as a proposal to increase the distribution of cash dividends, a
proposal to establish a nomination committee, and a vote against
certain investments associated with high risks, to name a few.
Nevertheless, this study revealed that among the various reasons for
dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors, the most
common ones centered around “insufficient information” and others
of a similar nature, including “the company did not provide
directors with relevant materials”; “the meeting was arranged with
short notice and directors did not have sufficient time and
opportunity to study the pros and cons of this project”; “the decision
was made in haste without comprehensive discussion”; “some items
needed to be further audited”; “there was no evaluation and no
feasibility study for the investment project”; “the proposal needs the
assistance of other professionals”; “the professional person should
be present and make a report in the board meeting”; and so on. This
study finds that such “insufficient information” or similar reasons
accounted for 16.8% out of all the dissenting opinions delivered by
independent directors (Please see Table 2).
Table 2: “Insufficient Information” as the Reason for Dissenting
Opinions Delivered by Independent Directors

Insufficient
information

TWSEListed
15/86
(17.4%)

TPExListed
7/62
(11.3%)

ESBTraded
5/13
(38.5%)

Total
27/161
(16.8%)

This 16.8% number corresponds closely to the result from an
August 2009 questionnaire-based survey conducted by Professor
Len-Yu Liu. Liu’s study sent out 585 questionnaires to independent
directors of TWSE-Listed companies and got back 276 replies.
Based on the replies received, 18% of the independent directors
thought that the key factor having the most negative influence on
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the performance of their duties was “the obstacle of access to
information”, which ranked second overall among the negative
factors listed. 29 The percentage for TWSE-Listed companies in the
present study was 17.4% as shown in Table 2, which is even closer
to the above 18% result of Liu’s questionnaire. Data suggest that in
the ten-year period following the 2009 questionnaire, there was little
to no improvement in the problem of insufficient information for
independent directors. The implication of this points to the
necessity of ensuring access by independent directors to sufficient
and adequate information; and, to work on ways to strengthen their
rights to secure information and the inspection of company records,
both of which should form the cornerstone for the effective
performance of the duties envisioned by the independent director
mechanism.
Companies’ lack of disclosure or explanation for the reasons
of independent director’s dissenting opinion is another matter of
note. Many companies simply neglect to fill-in the “Reason Item”
required on the MOPS. Lax enforcement of disclosure requirements
leads to incomplete market information as well as a lack of
precision for investors trying to analyze and interpret the basis of
any dissenting opinions, defeating the objective of full disclosure
for public oversight. Regrettably, failures to elaborate and explain
have been all too common, as indicated by Table 3 where 22.4% of
all dissenting opinions delivered by independent directors in this
study neglected to provide any reasons or explanations.

29 The question is “Based on your experience as an independent director, which of the
followings do you think is the key factor that has negative influence on performing your
duties as an independent director? (A) obstacle of access to information (18%); (B)
personal relationship (10%); (C) insufficient remuneration, no incentive (7%); (D)
insufficient time to devote (28%); (E) lack of professional ability, no effective monitoring
(7%); (F) insufficient monitoring due to expectation of re-election (1%); (G) no problem at
all (57%).” Len-Yu Liu (劉連煜), Duli Dongshi Shi Shaoshu Gudong Zhi Shouhushen?—
Taiwan Shangshi Shanggui Gongsi Duli Dongshi Zhidu Zhi Jiantao Yu Jianyi (獨立董事
是少數股東之守護神？—台灣上市上櫃公司獨立董事制度之檢討與建議) [Is the
Independent Director a Patron Saint of Minority Shareholders? A Review and Proposal of
the Independent Director Mechanism in TWSE/TPEx-Listed Companies in Taiwan], 26
CROSS-STRAIT L. REV. (月旦民商法雜誌) 29, 36-37 (2009).
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Table 3: No Explanation for Reasons Associated with the
Dissenting Opinions Delivered by Independent Directors

No
Explanation

TWSEListed
17/86
(19.8%)

TPExListed
13/62
(21%)

ESBTraded
6/13
(46.2%)

Total
36/161
(22.4%)

The findings shown in Table 3 illustrate how ESB-Traded
companies appear to be the most serious violators of the
requirement to post explanations: 46.2% of ESB-Traded companies
failed to disclose the reasons for the dissenting opinions of their
independent directors. This points to the substantial room for
improvement needed in the enforcement of full disclosure by the
competent authority.
C. Responses to Independent Director Dissenting Opinions
The issue underpinning this study is the extent to which
dissenting opinions impact the decisions of the board and whether
they can even affect the outcomes of board resolutions. An
important index for both measuring the effectiveness of dissenting
opinions and evaluating the functioning of the independent director
mechanism in Taiwan is the reaction to them by boards, that is to
say the board response elicited by the dissenting opinions of their
independent directors.
Based on the data collected on the MOPS, this study
classifies board meeting responses, for example, the positions a
company takes in reaction to dissenting opinions delivered by
independent directors, into five categories: (1) the board meeting
passes the resolution in spite of the dissenting opinion; 30 (2) the
company publishes the dissenting opinion in compliance with
material information disclosure laws; 31 (3) the board meeting
accepts and follows the dissenting opinion; (4) no explanation; and
30 For purposes of calculation in this study, company disclosures on the MOPS stated
as “ Handled per the board’s resolution and material information published in accordance
with the law”, will be counted as a Category (1) response: “the board meeting passes the
resolution in spite of the dissenting opinion.”
31 This category includes the simple disclosure of “material information published in
accordance with the law” without any other explanations.
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(5) others. The results from this empirical study are shown in Table
4.
Table 4: The Response to Dissenting Opinions Delivered by
Independent Directors
TWSE-Listed
Pass
the
Resolution
Publish as
Material
Information
Follow ID’s
Opinions
No
Explanation
Others

TPEx-Listed

ESB-Traded

Total

10/86 (11.6%) 10/62(16.1%) 2/13 (15.4%) 22/161
(13.7%)
46/86 (53.5%) 11/62
0/13 (0%)
57/161
(17.7%)
(35.4%)
16/86 (18.6%) 11/62
(17.7%)
13/86 (15.1%) 27/62
(43.5%)
1/86 (1.2%) 32 3/62 (4.9%) 33

0/13 (0%)
11/13
(84.6%)
0/13 (0%)

27/161
(16.8%)
51/161
(31.7%)
4/161
(2.5%)

As indicated in Table 4, 16.8% of the boards accepted and
followed the dissenting opinions of their independent directors.
This is not considered to be a high percentage. In addition, TWSEListed companies indicated a slightly greater level of respect toward
the dissenting opinions of their independent directors, accepting and
following 18.6%. As for ESB-Traded companies, there was not
even a single case in which the board accepted and went along with
a dissenting opinion issued by an independent director.
Strictly speaking, except for category (3), where by the
board accepts and follows a dissenting opinion delivered by
independent directors, all other responses were the equivalent of
32 The disclosure of the company was “The company was in full accordance with the
Company Act and the resolution of the 2014 first special shareholders meeting.” See infra
Appendix p.34 (showing the dissenting opinion of (TWSE 2) on Mar. 24, 2017).
33 The responses of the three companies in this category were “[e]ntered into
reporting items for shareholders meeting at the request of the independent director”, “[p]er
attorney: changing the company seal is not a major issue” and “[p]er attorney: the special
shareholders meeting convened by supervisor is against the law.” See infra Appendix
pp.42-44 (showing dissenting opinions of (TPEX6) on Mar. 24, 2015, (TPEX 9) on Sept.
18, 2016 and (TPEX 9) on Sept. 20, 2016, respectively).
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disregard for the dissenting opinions through the passage of
resolutions by the prevailing board members followed by disclosure
of the requisite material information as a routine legal procedure.
The remaining responses constituted 80.8% of the surveyed events
and demonstrated the rarity of independent directors exerting any
substantial influence on the decisions of their boards, much less
effecting a change to the result.
Note that disclosure laws require only that companies make
known and publish on the MOPS only those opinions of
independent directors that are in dissent; if, on the other hand, an
independent director has a different opinion on certain agenda and
his/her opinion is accepted at the close of the board meeting, there
will be no disclosure or publication of such case. 34 Therefore, data
for such cases could not be found on the MOPS and were not
available as a parameter for a more nuanced evaluation of
independent director influence.
It is worth noting that out of the 16 accept-and-follow
responses for boards of TWSE-Listed companies, 14 were delivered
by two or three independent directors in a collective action, and
only 2 were delivered by a single director. 35 This result infers that
acts of solidarity by independent directors have a greater impact and
higher chance for effecting change on board decisions. In other
words, the ability of independent directors to communicate and
discuss their dissent amongst each other and reach consensus prior
to a board meeting, as well as the opportunity to deliver their
opinions together, has a direct impact on the level of respect
companies confer upon their dissenting opinions and how seriously
they treat them. This has obvious bearing on the aim of enhancing
corporate governance through the independent director mechanism
and the ability to achieve it.
Finally, 31.7% of the responses to dissenting opinions of
independent directors disclosed on the MOPS were relegated to the
category of “No Explanation.” As discussed in the above Section
III.B, such insufficient and incomplete disclosure undermines the
ability to publicly evaluate the efficacy of the role played by
independent directors.
See supra notes 13 & 21.
See infra Appendix pp. 32-33, 38, 40 (showing dissenting opinions of (TWSE12)
on Jan. 13, 2017, (TWSE13) on Feb. 9, 2017, (TWSE13) on July 25, 2017, (TWSE20) Aug.
9, 2017, and (TWSE23) Nov. 10, 2017, respectively).
34
35
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D. Correlation between Independent Director Dissenting Opinions
and Re-elections
Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk and Professor Assaf Hamdani
assert in their recent paper that:
[t]he existing director-election regime significantly
undermines the ability of independent directors to
effectively perform their oversight role. Both the
election and retention of independent directors
normally depend on the controlling shareholders. As
a result, these directors have incentives to go along
with controllers’ wishes, or, at least, have inadequate
incentives to protect public investors. 36
Taiwan’s situation is the same if not worse, since corporate
ownership in Taiwan’s public companies is characterized by a
tendency for the concentration of shares amongst a few holders and
family-domination, as well as by the prevalence of business
groups. 37 A leading scholar in Taiwan observes that “[t]he virtue of
an independent director is his/her independence from the control of
management and/or major shareholders. However, under existing
Taiwanese laws, the election of independent directors is heavily
dependent on the support of major shareholders/management. The
independence of independent directors might be even less than that
of supervisors.” 38 Therefore, an independent director who makes
inquiries, reservations, or votes against resolutions might be cast as
a “trouble-maker” by the controlling shareholder/management of a
company.
This study explores an interesting and intriguing question:
Whether an independent director who delivers dissenting opinions
can garner support from controlling shareholders and still retain
his/her seat on the board as an independent director for a subsequent
term(s).
36 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling
Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2017).
37 Yin-Hua Yeh, Tsun-Siou Lee & Tracie Woidtke, Family Control and Corporate
Governance: Evidence from Taiwan, 2 INT’L REV. of FINANCE, 21 (2001). See also CHANG,
LIN & TSAI, supra note 1, at 259.
38 IN-JAW LAI (賴英照), THE NEWEST ANALYSIS OF SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT
(最新證券交易法解析：股市遊戲規則) 204 (2014).
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This study finds 35, 35, and 13 independent directors on
boards of TWSE-Listed, TPEx-Listed and ESB-Traded companies,
respectively, delivered dissenting opinions during the 5-year period
(2013-2017). The websites of the Ministry of Economic Affairs
(“MOEA”) 39 and MOPS were then checked to ascertain whether
such independent directors were still registered as independent
directors on the date of July 28, 2018. This investigation reveal that
out of the aforementioned independent directors, 23, 16, and 7,
respectively, remained registered as an independent director per
Table 5.
Table 5: Independent Directors Delivering Dissenting Opinions
Remain on the Boards
TWSEListed
No. of IDs 23/35
having
(66%)
delivered
dissenting
opinions
remaining on
boards/ Total
No. of IDs
Delivering
Dissenting
Opinions

TPExListed
16/35
(46%)

ESBTraded
7/13 (54%)

Total
46/83
(55%)

Table 5 shows that the average percentage of independent
directors who delivered dissenting opinions and remained on aboard
was 55% for the combined sum of TWSE/TPEx-Listed and ESBTraded companies. This retention rate was highest for TWSEListed companies at about 66%, but lowest for TPEx-Listed
companies at about 46%. Certain limitations, however, do require
consideration as to their impact on this correlational study.
First, reasons resulting in a change to the status quo include
resignations, discharges, term limits, deaths, or new-elections. A
company is required to disclose a status change on the MOPS when
an independent director resigns or relinquishes his/her seat before a
39 DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUS. REGISTRATION INQUIRY SERV. (經濟部商業司商工登記
公示資料查詢服務), http://findbiz.nat.gov.tw [https://perma.cc/UM8D-U5B3].
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term’s end. This study aims to uncover the reasons for an
independent director’s resignation or in-term relinquishment.
Unsurprisingly, explanations given on the MOPS have a high
degree of both similarity and ambiguity, such as “personal reasons”,
“busy at work”, “personal career plan” or “health condition”. Such
explanations offer very little information regarding the correlation
between the relinquishment of an independent director’s seat and
his/her delivery of dissenting opinions. Second, discerning from the
above-listed ambiguous reasons disclosed on the MOPS as to
whether the relinquishment of a seat by an independent director was
a passive or active act is a near impossibility. 40 Third, this study
investigated a five-year period but the terms for independent
directors last three years, and companies are not required to give
reasons why former independent directors were not re-nominated or
re-elected at the end of their terms when disclosing newly elected
independent directors on the MOPS. 41 In addition, director terms
are, of course, not synchronized amongst the various companies, so
the election timing varies; thus, an independent director no longer
registered on the website of MOEA as of July 28, 2018 might just
be due to the expiry of his/her term. Fourth, this study can neither
exclude the possibility of other factors nor surmise their influence
on the decisions of independent directors to stay or leave, such as
remuneration standards, 42 exposure to liabilities, 43 enterprise
For example, the controlling shareholder or management hints to the independent
director that it is no longer suitable for him/her to remain in office.
41 COMPANY ACT, supra note 12, at art. 195. (providing that “[t]he term of office of a
director shall not exceed three years; but he/she may be eligible for re-election”). In
practice, the term of office of a director, including an independent director, is three years in
almost all companies.
42 A 2007 study indicates that remuneration for independent directors at a TWSEListed company averaged about one million NTD per year; while at a TWSE-Listed
company with an audit committee, the average remuneration of each independent director
was about 400 million NTD per year. On the other hand, a TPEx-Listed company with
independent directors averaged remuneration of about 0.3 million NTD per year for
independent directors; while a TPEx-Listed company with an audit committee, the average
remuneration of each independent director stayed around 0.3 million per year as well. LenYu Liu (劉連煜), Xianxing Shangshi Shanggui Gongsi Duli Dongshi Zhidu Zhi Jiantao Ji
Gaijin Fangan—Cong Shizheng Mian Chufa (現行上市上櫃公司獨立董事制度之檢討暨
改進方案—從實證面出發) [A Study of the Regime of Independent Directors of Listed
Companies in Taiwan—Approach], 114 CHENG-CHI L. REV. (政大法學評論) 53, 117-118
(2010).
43 Starting from 2014, the number of independent director resignations has been
increasing every year in Taiwan. Fifty-five independent directors resigned in 2014; 71
independent directors resigned in 2015; 93 independent directors resigned in 2016; 53
40
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cultures, or working environments, etc. Fifth, this study focused on
independent directors who had delivered dissenting opinions that
were recorded on the MOPS during the designated five-year period.
To understand the correlation between the delivery of dissenting
opinions and the re-election of independent directors more clearly,
an empirical study of a comparative group, for example, the reelection of those independent directors who never delivered
dissenting opinions, should also be undertaken. However, an
empirical study of such large-scale was beyond the capacity of this
study and, furthermore, would have entailed a degree of complexity
beyond the scope of this preliminary investigation. For example,
this study traced 83 independent directors who delivered dissenting
opinions during the five-year period to ascertain whether they had
remained on their respective boards, which was within the handling
capacity of this study. However, those independent directors who
have never delivered a dissenting opinion is of much greater
magnitude. For the single year of 2017, there were about 4223
independent directors for all TWSE/TPEx-Listed companies, and
only 48 had ever delivered a dissenting opinion. 44 It means that this
study would have had to track 4175 independent directors who had
never delivered a dissenting opinion to check whether they had
remained on their boards as independent directors. Adding to the
degree of difficulty was the fact that this study consisted of a fiveyear survey; and, as such, resignations, discharges, deaths, reelections or term expiries for independent directors were made that
much more difficult to clearly and accurately trace.
Due to the aforementioned limitations, venturing to claim
that there is a positive and direct correlation between the delivery of
dissenting opinions by independent directors and their re-elections
may overstate the case; nevertheless, the findings do shed light on
the issue and point to the strong likelihood of a correlation. The 45%
independent directors resigned in the first half of 2017. In total, 272 independent directors
have resigned over this three-and-a-half-year period. It is claimed that there is a crisis for
corporate governance in Taiwan because independent directors choose to jump ship (leave
the board). Yen-Wen Wang ( 王 妍 文 ), Dulidongshi Fenfen Qingci,
3.5Nian272Tiaochuan—Nianxinqianwan, Daodi shi Zhuanhenda haishi Zuogongde (獨立
董事紛紛請辭，3.5 年 272 人跳船—年薪千萬，到底是賺很大還是做功德？) [The
Resignation of Independent Directors: For Good or For Worse, 272 Persons Committed
Suicides by Jumping out of Boats in 3.5 years?], GLOBAL VIEWS MONTHLY (遠見) (Dec. 26,
2017), https://www.gvm.com.tw/article.html?id=41680 [https://perma.cc/G4VL-KUR3].
44 See infra Appendix pp. 32-34, 44-47.
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result shown for independent directors who delivered dissenting
opinions as not being re-elected carries a certain amount of weight
and merits further study.
If an independent director considers the re-nomination and
re-election of the next term a very important goal, he/she might
consciously choose to avoid confrontation with the controlling
shareholder or management by not delivering dissenting opinions
when performing his/her fiduciary duties. This would most
certainly have a negative impact on the soundness of the
independent director mechanism and its aim to improve corporate
governance.

IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS FROM THE RESULTS OF THIS
EMPIRICAL STUDY
Scholars have identified the lack of information as the core
of gatekeeper failure to have an impact on corporate governance. 45
This has highlighted a fundamental paradox, namely, that
Independence Actually Creates Dependency, since independent
directors must then rely on company insiders to obtain
information. 46 This study, thus, illustrates how the cornerstone for
an effective independent director mechanism is Sufficient
Information or Access to Information: For example, no information
equates to no monitoring. 47
With sufficient information,
independent directors can have a solid foundation on which to base
their support, modifications, reservations or objections to
resolutions. Without sufficient information, on the other hand, the
only recourse that independent directors have when delivering
dissenting opinions, including reservations and vetoes, is to rely on
the protections afforded them under existing Taiwanese laws.
45 Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failure: Why Important, What to Do, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1089, 1091 (2008); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPER-THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 8 (2006).
46 J. N. Druey, Unabhaegigkeitals Gebot des allgemeinen Unternehmensrechts, in
FESTSCHRIFT PETER DORALT 163, 169 (S. Kalss, C. Nowotny & M. Schauer (eds), Manz,
2004) (citing INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA - A HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL AND
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 27 (Dan W. Puchniak , Harald Baum & Luke Nottage eds.,
2017)).
47 Len-Yu Liu (劉連煜), I-Ching Tu (杜怡靜), Yu-Hsin Lin (林郁馨) & Christopher
Chen Chao-Hung (陳肇鴻), XUANREN DULI DONGSHI YU GONGSI ZHILI (選任獨立董事與
公司治理) [ELECTION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] 16
(2013).
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Moreover, boards with a majority of independent directors are rare
in Taiwan, so independent directors, being in the minority, need to
act collectively if they want to have their opinions respected and
accepted by the board. To reach this goal, independent directors
need to be able to communicate with each other and discuss
information amongst themselves prior to board meetings. The issue
of sufficient information or access to information before a board
meeting is crucial to effective coordination and cooperation
amongst independent directors.
On April 25, 2018, Paragraph 3, Article 14-2 was added to
Taiwan’s SEA. It provides that:
[t]he company may not impede, refuse, or evade the
actions of the independent directors in the
performance of their duties. As the independent
directors deem necessary to the performance of their
duties, they may request the board of directors to
appoint relevant personnel, or may at their own
discretion hire professionals to provide assistance.
The related expenses will be borne by the company.
The legislative impetus behind this amendment was that:
[a]lthough the laws require certain professional
background of an independent director, it is hard to
expect that an independent director will have the
professions of accounting, law and corporate
governance at the same time. In addition, the past
court decisions set a higher standard of conduct for
independent directors to perform their duties,
sometimes even higher than that of certified public
accountants or lawyers, which is inconsistent and
disproportionate with the powers of independent
directors. Therefore, if an independent director
would like to responsibly perform his/her duties as
well as make an independent and objective judgment,
it is better to have professionals to provide him/her
with assistance so that such an independent director
can effectively monitor the operation of the company
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and protect the rights and interests of shareholders . . .
48

This type of amendment has been widely praised as a
corrective response with respect to the importance of sufficient
information for independent directors. It specifies that the company
may not impede, refuse, or evade the actions of the independent
directors in the performance of their duties and entitles an
independent director with the right to obtain the assistance of
professionals.
Article 218 of the Company Act also sets forth that:
[s]upervisors shall supervise the execution of
business operations of the company, and may at any
time or from time to time investigate the business
and financial conditions of the company, inspect,
transcribe or make copies of the accounting books
and documents, and request the board of directors or
managerial personnel to make reports thereon.
This right to inspection and relevant information granted to
supervisors is also applied mutatis mutandis to an independent
director. 49
Based on the above laws, independent directors have, in
theory, the right to sufficient information for the performance of
their duties. However, in practice, whether independent directors
exercise such rights and the manner in which companies implement
these laws still requires further observation.
Ironically, the draft 2017 Amendment to the Company Act,
submitted to the Legislative Yuan by the Executive Yuan, includes a
newly-added Article 193-1 that specifically provides directors with
both the right to information and protection against company
impediments: “[f]or the purpose of performing their duties, directors
may at any time or from time to time inspect, transcribe or make
copies of the business and financial condition as well as accounting
48 Legislative Yuan, Yidong Tiaowen ji Liyou: Zhengquan Jiaoyi Fa (異動條文及理
由: 證券交易法)
[Changed Clauses and Reasons: Securities Exchange Law], LIFA YUAN FALV XITONG (立
法院法律系統) [LEGISLATIVE YUAN LEGAL SYSTEM], https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lglawc/lglawkm
[https://perma.cc/5HAW-GC47].
49 SEC. EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 14-4. 4.
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books and documents of the company, and the company may not
evade, impede or refuse such action.” The legislative purpose
behind this proposed amendment can be inferred to be an intent to
expand director rights:
Article 8 and Article 23 of the Company Act set forth
that a director is the responsible person of a limitedby-share company, and he/she shall have the loyalty
and shall exercise the due care of a good
administrator in conducting the business operation of
the company; and if he/she has acted contrary to this
provision, shall be liable for the damages to be
sustained by the company there from.
For
performing their duties, directors shall have the right
to inspect, transcribe and make copies of the Articles
of Incorporation, accounting books and documents as
provided in Article 210 and the company may not
refuse such action. Therefore, taking reference from
the Article 218 regarding the scope of inspection
right of supervisors, this amendment expands the
scope of director’s inspection right. 50
Despite this implied necessity, the proposed amendment was
deleted by the Legislative Yuan on July 6, 2018 out of concerns
having to do with investors from China, conflicts over corporate
control and protections of trade secrets. 51 Without rights to
50 Executive Yuan, Xingzheyuan Hui Tongguo “Gongsi Fa” Bufen Tiaowen Xiuzheng
Caoan (行政院會通過「公司法」部分條文修正草案) [Executive Yuan Conference
Passed Draft Amendments on Part of the Clauses of “Company Act”],
https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD91/7d24c7d1-11ec-4edb-88d5e7512506814e [https://perma.cc/W5MF-XXPC] (Dec. 21, 2017). Shareholders have the
right to inspect, transcribe and make copies of the Articles of Incorporation, the minutes of
every shareholders’ meeting, financial statements, the shareholders roster and the
counterfoil of corporate bonds issued by the company as provided in Article 210. Also,
supervisors have the right to inspect, transcribe or make copies of the accounting books
and documents, and request the board of directors or managerial personnel to make reports
thereon as provided in Article 218. However, there is no article explicitly empowering
directors the right of inspection in the Company Act. In addition, the court decisions are
split regarding whether directors have the same inspection rights as supervisors. Therefore,
this proposed amendment is inferred to be an intent to expand director’s inspection right.
51 The main reason for such deletion is the concern that investors from China can
easily copy the trade secrets of Taiwanese companies as long as they manage to get elected
to the board. In addition, if there is a fight for corporate control between an incumbent
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inspection and proper access to information, the ability of directors
to perform their fiduciary duties and efforts to improve the quality
of corporate governance are severely hampered, in particular,
companies might recklessly refuse requests by directors to inspect
their records. 52 Such a deletion with direct implications on director
rights to inspection should be subject to further review and
deliberation.
Other measures to improve the rights to information for
independent directors, in addition to those reviewed above, should
also be considered. First, a mechanism to facilitate independent
director meetings with internal auditors and certified public
accountants, without management present, should be actively
pursued and established. 53 Paragraph 4, Article 7 of the Regulations
Governing the Exercise of Powers by Audit Committees of Public
Companies provides that:
The audit committee may by resolution request
relevant department officers, internal auditors,
certified public accountants, legal counsels, or other
personnel to attend the meeting as nonvoting
participants and provide pertinent and necessary
information; provided, they shall leave the meeting
when discussion and voting take place. 54

group and an acquiring group, and if the acquiring group has a seat on the board, it can use
this right of inspection granted to directors to inspect trade secrets and other documents of
the target company. See Wan-Hsin Peng (彭琬馨), Chaoye Jiaofeng, Puxuan Chayue
Quan Wei Guo (朝野交鋒，普董查閱權未過) [Debate in Legislative Yuan, Deletion of
Director’s Inspection Right], LIBERTY TIMES NET ( 自 由 時 報 ) (July 7, 2018),
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1214753 [https://perma.cc/W8FX-848V].
52 Wallace Wen-Yu Wang (王文宇), Gongsi Fa Ren You Gaijin Kongjian (公司法仍
有改進空間) [There Are Some Rooms for Improvement of the Company Act], JINGJI RIBAO
DAILY
NEWS]
(July
10,
2018),
( 經 濟 日 報 )
[ECONOMIC
https://money.udn.com/money/story/5629/3243724 [https:// perma.cc/8KNN-KMTE].
53 Qianghua Duli Dongshi Zhineng Luoshi Gongsi Zhili, (強化獨立董事職能 落實公
司 治 理 ) [Strengthening the Function of Independent Directors and Implementing the
Corporate Governance], CHINATIMES.COM (中時 電 子 報 ) (Oct. 28, 2016, 04:11 AM),
http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20161028000095-260210 [https://perma.cc/X2L2RBDJ].
54 AUDIT COMMITTEE REGULATIONS, supra note 17, at art. 7. (showing that the
amendment adopted on July 28, 2017 was to strengthen the corporate governance and
avoid the presence of non-voting participants as an influencing factor on the discussions
and votes of the audit committee).
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Also, Paragraph 2, Article 3 of the Corporate Governance
Best Practice Principles for TWSE/TPEx Listed Companies
provides that:
TWSE/TPEx Listed companies are advised to
establish
channels
and
mechanisms
of
communication between their independent directors,
audit committees or supervisors, and chief internal
auditors, and the convener of the audit committee or
supervisors shall report their communication with the
independent directors and chief internal auditors at
the shareholders’ meeting. 55
This type of best practice has also become one of the
indicators for the Corporate Governance Evaluation System of the
TWSE. 56
Second, the corporate secretary mechanism should be
instituted since the corporate secretary has the duty to provide all
directors with the full information regarding the business of the
company. 57 In the draft of the 2017 Amendment to Company Act
submitted to the Legislative Yuan by the Executive Yuan, the
proposed Article 215-1 sets forth that “[t]he company may establish
a corporate governance professional to assist directors and
supervisors to perform the duty of loyalty and the due care of a good
administrator in conducting the business operation of the
company.” 58 This corporate governance professional has a role
highly similar to that of a corporate secretary. However, this
Shangshi Shanggui Gongsi Zhili Shiwu Shouze (上市上櫃公司治理實務守則)
[Corporate Governance Best Practice Principles for TWSE/TPEx Listed Companies]
(promulgated by TWSE, Dec. 12, 2018, effective Dec. 12, 2018),
http://eng.selaw.com.tw/LawArticle.aspx?LawID=FL020553&ModifyDate=1071212
[https://perma.cc/Z5PW-C9BE].
56 TAIWAN STOCK EXCHANGE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CENTER, THE 2019
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
EVALUATION
INDICATOR
2.15
(Jan.
2019),
http://cgc.twse.com.tw/evaluationCorp/listEn [perma.cc/7TEX-7MCK].
57 Wan-Ru Tseng(曾宛如) & Christopher Chen Chao-Hung (陳肇鴻), Jianli Gongsi
Mishu Zhidu zhi Chuyi (建立公司秘書制度之芻議) [The Proposal to Establish the
Corporate Secretary Mechanism], 226 TAIWAN L. REV. (月旦法學雜誌) 106, 118 (2014).
58 Executive Yuan, Xingzheyuan Hui Tongguo “Gongsi Fa” Bufen Tiaowen Xiuzheng
Caoan (行政院會通過「公司法」部分條文修正草案) [Executive Yuan Conference
Passed Draft Amendments on Part of the Clauses of “Company Act”],
https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD91/7d24c7d1-11ec-4edb-88d5e7512506814e [https://perma.cc/W5MF-XXPC] (Dec. 21, 2017).
55
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proposal was deleted by the Legislative Yuan in the final version of
the 2018 Company Act.
The FSC realizes the importance of the corporate secretary
mechanism for promoting corporate governance and has adopted the
corporate governance professional mechanism in its Corporate
Governance Roadmap (2018-2020). The FSC will implement such
mechanism in two phases: starting from 2019 (Phase I), companies
in the financial industry and TWSE/TPEx-Listed non-financial
companies with paid-in capital of NTD 10 billion or more should
establish at least one such professional; and, starting from 2021
(Phase II), TWSE/TPEx Listed non-financial companies with paidin capital not less than NTD 2 billion but less than TWD 10 billion
should establish at least one such professional. 59
Third, independent directors should have greater power with
respect to internal and external auditing. Audit committees shall
have the direct and final decisions on the appointment, discharge,
performance evaluation and remuneration of the chief internal
auditor and certified public accountant, and as such, internal and
external auditors should not be subject to simply obeying the CEO
or general manager. 60 Under the existing Article 14-5 of the SEA in
Taiwan, “the hiring or dismissal of an attesting CPA, or the
compensation given thereto” and “the appointment or discharge of a
financial, accounting, or internal auditing officer” are within the
authority of the audit committee. 61
A notable example of reducing the “information gap” that
exists between management and the board is that of Netflix, which
is implemented as a novel board practice. The Netflix approach has
incorporated two highly unique practices: (1) Board members
periodically attend (in an observing capacity only) monthly and
quarterly senior management meetings, and (2) board
communications are structured as approximately 30-page online
59 FIN. SUPERVISORY COMMISSION, R.O.C (TAIWAN) SECURITIES AND FUTURES
BUREAU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROADMAP (2018-2020) (May 10, 2018),
https://www.sfb.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?id=106&parentpath=0,8,105
[https://perma.cc/W6U7-SEG5].
60 Chang-Hsien Tsai (蔡昌憲), Xingsi Gongsi Zhili Xia Zhi Neibu Jiandu Jizhi—Yi
Duli Zixun Guandao de Qianghua wei Hexin (省思公司治理下之內部監督機制——以獨
立資訊管道的強化為核心) [Rethinking Internal Monitoring Mechanisms of Corporate
Governance: An Approach to Strengthening Independent Information Channels], 141
CHENGCHI L. REV. (政大法學評論) 197, 258-259 (2015).
61 SEC. EXCHANGE ACT, supra note 2, at art. 14-5.
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memos in narrative form that not only include links to supporting
analyses but also allow open access to all data and information on
the company’s internal shared systems, including the ability to ask
clarifying questions from the subject authors. This quarterly memo
is written by and shared with the top 90 executives as well as the
board. 62 Such practice might be a worthwhile reference for some
Taiwanese companies.
Finally, from the perspective of disclosure, in the process of
collecting information, this study has found that some of the
required items or explanations in public disclosures of dissenting
opinions delivered by independent directors are either left blank or
filled-in with incomplete or ambiguous descriptions: Specifically,
the disclosure items for “the reason for dissenting opinions,” “the
response to the dissenting opinions” and “the reason for leaving the
office as an independent director” are yet to be completed. The
competent authority, FSC, should strengthen their enforcement on
the implementation of disclosure. Otherwise, such insufficient
disclosures will fail to provide investors and markets with complete
information for bettering understanding as per one of the functions
of independent directors, as well as hinder evaluations concerning a
company’s corporate governance.

V. CONCLUSION
Several important results from this empirical study
contribute to the field of corporate governance. First, the number of
incidents for the delivery of dissenting opinions by independent
directors has been shown to increase sharply in recent years for
companies in all three areas (TWSE, TPEx, and ESB). Nonetheless,
the number of independent directors delivering dissenting opinions
remains comparatively small as indicated, for example, by the 1.1%
ratio (48 dissensions out of a total of 4223 independent directors)
for 2017. 63 In general, the percentage of independent directors
delivering dissenting opinions in Taiwan, as indicated by this study,
is quite low.
David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Netflix Approach to Governance: Genuine
Transparency
with
the
Board
(May
10,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/10/netflix-approach-to-governance-genuinetransparency-with-the-board [https://perma.cc/R2B3-QYW6].
63 See supra note 28.
62
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Second, the reasons given for dissenting opinions by
independent directors are rather diverse. Nevertheless, this study
finds the reason of insufficient information, and those of a similar
nature, to be relatively common. This result indicates that for the
independent director mechanism to function more effectively, the
issue of information asymmetry with respect to independent
directors is urgent in Taiwan.
Third, from the perspective of whether dissenting opinions
delivered by independent directors actually impact or change board
decisions, this study has revealed that only 16.8% of the dissenting
opinions delivered by independent directors, during the 5-year
period reviewed, has been accepted and followed by the board.
TWSE-Listed companies showed the highest percentage of
acceptance for dissenting opinions, which is 18.6%. In addition,
this study points to collective action as a positive factor in the
delivery of dissenting opinions by independent directors, since the
probability of board-meeting acceptance and adherence increased in
such cases.
Fourth, the average percentage of independent directors
remaining in office as independent directors after delivering
dissenting opinions was 55% as of July 28, 2018. Due to some
limitations to this research, a positive and direct correlation between
an independent director’s dissenting opinion and his/her re-election
could not be definitively reached. Nevertheless, this result sheds
light on the possibility of a very pertinent correlation in Taiwan.
Furthermore, this study strongly implies the foundational
importance of sufficient information as a cornerstone to the
performance of the independent director role and discusses some
measures to improve its function in Taiwan.
Finally, to more fully evaluate the effectiveness of the
independent director mechanism in Taiwan, more complete and
clear disclosure on the MOPS should be enforced.
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[APPENDIX] CHART OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR
DISSENTING OPINIONS (2013-2017)
Explanation:
1. Independent director dissenting opinions assessed in this
study covered the time period from 1/1/2013 to 12/31/2017.
2. Collection of data on the circumstances for a director’s
vacancy of his/her seat was discontinued after 7/28/2018. In
determining whether an independent director was still
registered as such as of 7/28/2018, this study relied upon
data publicly available on the website of the Department of
Commerce of Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs as
well as information disclosed on the Market Observation
Post System (MOPS) of the Taiwan Stock Exchange
Corporation. An asterisk (*) by a director’s name indicates a
director’s continued status as an independent director,
whereas the absence of an asterisk without any other
explanation is indicative of a departure. Additionally, for
the purposes of this study, members of remuneration
committees who did not originally have independent director
status, regardless of whether or not they were later elected as
independent directors, were still considered in the tally of
independent directors who stayed or left as of 7/28/2018.
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TWSE-listed Companies
Year

Company Date

Subject

2013

(TWSE 1) 10
APR
2013

(TWSE ID1) 64 Review of compensation
(Remuneration and methods of
committee)
assessment for supervisors
& managers.

(TWSE 2) 01
JUL
2013

(TWSE ID2)* Item on “the company’s
merger with company A;
the company to be
maintained, whereas
company A to be
dissolved” being brought
before the meeting of
managing directors for
review.
(TWSE ID2) Item on “the members and
authority of the company’s
merger investigatory task
force,” being brought
before the meeting of
managing directors for
review.
(TWSE ID3)* Revision to the company’s
operational plan.

(TWSE 2) 05
JUL
2013

(TWSE 3) 26
JUL
2013

Incident & Causes

Reason
[Veto]
TWSE ID1 expressed that the proposed
amendment of Article 7.11.3.1 (Group
chairman, general manager, dual-serving
executive director & deputy GM, . . .) was
unnecessary, and should retain the original
wording of the Article (Group chairman,
GM and deputy GM, . . .).
[Veto]
Not within the scope of authority for a
managing directors’ meeting.

[Veto]
Not within the scope of authority for a
managing directors’ meeting.

[Reservation]
The administrative act of the National
Communications Commission (NCC),
requiring that the company’s news channels
should be changed into non-news channels
in the completed operation plan, is not
entirely fair. The company, as a publicly
traded entity, should be dealt with from a
position of neutrality by the NCC, which
should avoid influencing the operational
policies and corporate governance of
publicly traded companies. The company’s

Subject TWSE 1 was not yet an independent director when this opinion was
delivered (the company did not yet have an independent director as of the date in 2013
when TWSE 1 viewed the revised by-laws).
64
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(TWSE 2) 05
AUG
2013

2015

(TWSE 4) 06
JAN
2015

(TWSE 5) 23
APR
2015

(TWSE 2) 04
MAY
2015
(TWSE 6) 12
AUG
2015
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passive cooperation with this demand of the
administrative act of the NCC would create
an inequity for the company’s shareholders.
(TWSE ID2) Proposal to the board of
[Veto]
(TWSE ID4) directors to pass
(1)
(TWSE ID2): reiterated opposition
resolutions on regular
on the two matters concerning the merger,
board meeting reported
“the case of the company’s merger with
matters, discussion items, company A” and “the establishment of an
matters of routine
investigative committee on the company’s
reporting, deliberations on merger with company A,” with a request
the sale of bad debt,
that these dissenting opinions be entered
deliberations on granting into the board minutes.
(2)
(TESE ID4): opposition to the two
credit, and other such
matters concerning the merger, “the case of
issues.
the company’s merger with company A”
and “the establishment of an investigative
committee on the company’s merger with
company A.”
(TWSE ID5) Consideration of
[Veto]
equipment replacement;
Concerns about financial liabilities and
and, operational and
impacts to company interests.
cooperative business
relationships in the
purchase of machinery
and equipment.
(TWSE ID6)* Rectification of all
[Veto]
resolutions and matters
from 2012 shareholders
meetings; and,
rectification of one board
member and supervisor
selected in the 7th term byelection as well as such
matters as their behavior
over an entire term.
(TWSE ID7)* Distributions of surplus
[Veto]
earnings for FY2013 and Suggest to raise the ratio for cash dividend
said distribution in the
distributions.
form of new shares.
(TWSE ID8) On planned application to [Veto]
Bank B for a continuation (1) Agree to delete Paragraph 1, (regarding
of the short-term credit
company’s operational plan) and Paragraph
limit and period.
2 (regarding yearly financial statement) of
On planned application to Article 3 in the “Rule concerning the
Bank C for a continuation Responsibilities and Regulations of
of short-term credit limit Independent Directors”, but other matters,
which, in accordance with relevant
and period.
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2016

(TWSE 6) 10
NOV
2015

(TWSE ID8)

(TWSE 2) 18
MAR
2016

(TWSE ID7)

(TWSE 7) 21
APR
2016

(TWSE ID9)
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On planned application to
Bank D for a continuation
of short-term credit limit
and period.
On plan to appoint
remuneration committee
for the third term.
On plan to stipulate the
responsibilities and
regulations for
independent directors.
On plan to stipulate the
exercise of authority and
method of remuneration
for board-hired
consultants.
On planned application to
Bank E for a continuation
of short-term credit limit
and period.
Proposal of FY105 Audit
Plan.
On the issue of the
proposal by Company F
(commissioned by the
company) to retain
Company G to carry out
the integration of urban
renewal projects.
On the revision of some
articles in the company’s
Articles of Incorporation
needed in order to align
the company’s business
developments with
relevant laws and
regulations.
Nomination of
independent director
candidates for the eighth
board term.

[Vol. 15

ordinances and the rules of the Articles of
Incorporation, are resolved by a
shareholders meeting or a board of directors
meeting or by the competent authority in the
case of material items, should still be
recorded and stated clearly in the meeting
minutes of the board, if independent
directors have dissenting opinions.
(2) Suggest that there be a board resolution
on consultant remuneration.
(3) In consideration of the monitoring duties
of the board, it would be inappropriate for
the company to nominate a director of an
unprofitable subsidiary to return as a
consultant to the subsidiary.
[Veto]

[Veto]
Opposed to the raising of the company’s
authorized capital from NTD90 billion to
NTD110 billion. Based on the company’s
capital adequacy indicators, the company
has sufficient capital for FY2016 to meet
the standard, therefore, for the present there
is no clear urgency to carry out the revision.
[Veto]
(1) One would expect that independent
director candidates nominated by a large
shareholder are qualified based on
international corporate governance
standards; there remains some doubt with
regards to the list of nominees presented
here by the board and their fields of
specialization.
(2) It was proposed that the board hire an

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

2019]

(TWSE 6) 02
JUN
2016

(TWSE ID8)
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unbiased outsider to take on the task of
setting up, in an organized manner, an
investigatory committee. Upon completion
of the report looking into the issues raised,
the matter should be brought before the
board again for discussion and resolution.
(3) Recommended that the company should
immediately revise the Articles of
Incorporation and a nomination committee
be set up under the board of directors, so as
to improve corporate governance.
[Veto]
Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.
Complete data was not included in the
notice to convene; relevant data for the
impairment of assets item not yet provided.

On the drafting of the
Management’s Report on
Internal Controls for
FY2015.
On the consolidated
financial statements and
individual financial
statements for FY2015.
On the issue of making-up [Veto]
for surpluses and losses
On the issue of the 2015
Annual Business Report.

Complete data was not included in the
notice to convene

Rectifying a supervisor to
represent the company in
the criminal case against A
for damages to reputation.
On revisions to some
articles of the Articles of
Incorporation.
On the drafting of the
plans for the 2016
shareholder meeting
concerning time, location
and relevant agenda and
reporting items.

Board member A’s statement should fall
within the scope of freedom of speech.
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(TWSE 8) 08
AUG
2016

(TWSE ID10) On the issue of overseas
subsidiary H plans to
purchase from a related
person the 24.98% stake
in company I and
indirectly hold 100%
shareholding of the
Mainland China
investment firm, J
company.

[Reservation]
Insufficient information to determine a
reasonable price for the transaction.

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

(TWSE 6) 24
OCT
2016

(TWSE ID8)

Revision to the Articles of Incorporation is
not required under Taiwan corporate law
since the issuance of employee stock
warrants is within the authorized capital
limits.
Error in the wording of the revision.

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

(TWSE 6) 24
OCT
2016
(TWSE 9) 10
NOV
2016

Revision of some parts of
the Articles of
Incorporation.

On revision to part of the
“Methods for the Election
of Directors and
Supervisors.”
Plans for convening a
special shareholders
meeting for a full reelection of the company
directors and supervisors.
On plan to cancel the noncompetition limitations for
directors and their
representatives
On drafting the time,
location, relevant reports,
and independent director
nominations for the first
special shareholders
meeting of 2016.
(TWSE ID11) Plans for convening a
special shareholders
meeting for a full reelection of the company’s
directors and supervisors.
(TWSE ID12) On the matter of a loan to
reinvest in company K for
company K’s factory
construction capital of
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Insufficient Information.

[Veto]

[Veto]

[Veto]

[Veto]

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.
Material
information
published in
accordance with

2019]

2017

(TWSE 6) 11
NOV
2016

(TWSE ID8)

(TWSE
10)

23
DEC
2016

(TWSE
11)

13
JAN
2017

(TWSE
ID13)*
(TWSE
ID14)*
(TWSE
ID15)*
(TWSE ID16)

(TWSE
12)

13
JAN
2017

(TWSE
ID17)*
(TWSE
ID18)*
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NTD250 million.
FY2017 audit plan.
Audit plan still needs adjusting.
Deliberations on standards Attachment on allocation standards lacking.
for the provision of
manager annual bonuses.
On the matter of
subscription for a capital
increase in the form of
cash for subsidiary L.

The general manager continues to discuss
and investigate with counterparts in the
joint venture about methods to improve
operations.

On the matter of the stoploss point for the Suzhou
investment or financing;
and, motion to loan
company N RMB2.95
million from subsidiary
M’s newly increased
capital.
On the matter of reinvestment to set-up
“Company O”.

[Reservation]

(TWSE 2) 24
JAN
2017

(TWSE ID7)

Proposal for board
deliberations about
agreement to terminate the
shareholder service agent
agreement of company P,
and the switch to company
Q as agent for shareholder
services.

(TWSE
13)

(TWSE
ID19)*

On the matter of handlingfee payments for financial
guarantees made to
guarantors.

09
FEB
2017
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[Reservation]
This matter passed after board discussion.
However, the research submitted to the
board is not complete in terms of data on
the competitive market for the investment
and situational analyses, such as levels of
sensitivity, along with minutes from internal
assessment meetings and other relevant
material.
[Veto]
The resolution process in this matter
violated rules on the avoidance of conflicts
of interest, and the resultant resolution
violated relevant laws and corporate
governance. The directors taking part in the
resolution should bear joint and several
liabilities in accordance with Article 193 of
the Company Act.
[Reservation]
Suggest to draft up relevant rules and
present at shareholders meeting for
approval.

the Law.
Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.
To be handled by
board resolution.

Management, in
accordance with
board’s opinion,
to provide
supplementary
information for
board’s
deliberation.

A relevant rule
will be drafted
based on the
independent
director’s opinion
and will be
presented at the
shareholders
meeting after
board approval.
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(TWSE
14)

09
MAR
2017

(TWSE
ID20)*

On revisions to Laos
investment.

(TWSE
15)

15
MAR
2017

(TWSE
ID21)*

On the distribution of
capital reserve in the form
of cash.

(TWSE 2) 24
MAR
2017

(TWSE 9) 13
APR
2017

(TWSE 5) 25
APR
2017

[Vol. 15

(1) Suggest to hire a corporate attorney and
CPA to provide professional opinion
following on-site investigation; and, the
investment sum should be remitted to an
escrow account as opposed to direct
remittance to Party B’s account.
(2) Financial controls should be
strengthened in the joint venture and a
management mechanism to protect funds
should be considered.
[Veto]

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

Handled per the
board’s resolution
and material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.
(TWSE ID7) On the election of
[Veto]
The company
directors for the 25th term Director terms should be in full accordance was in full
(including independent
with the Company Act and the resolution of accordance with
directors).
the 2014 first special shareholders meeting. the Company Act
and the resolution
of the 2014 first
special
shareholders
meeting.
(TWSE ID12) On capital reduction in the [Veto]
Material
form of cash.
Objection with respect to most participating information
directors and supervisors having only
published in
received notice of the meeting one day
accordance with
before in the afternoon; and, the resolution the Law.
on capital reduction having been rushed
through without directors being given the
opportunity to more fully discuss the matter
after having been able to look into its
advantages and disadvantages or gains and
losses.
(TWSE ID6) On the revision of some
[Veto]
(1)
After
parts of the Articles of
Audit Committee:
thorough
This proposal should be first sent to the
Incorporation.
discussion, the
internal management committee; the
proposal passed
proposal is not sufficiently exhaustive;
the audit
dividend payments for preferred shares are
committee at a
still too high; obvious infringements on the
ratio of 2:1 (all
rights of the company and individual
three members
shareholders. Recommend this case be sent
of the
back to the management committee for
committee
reconsideration.
present, 2 ayes
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Board:
and 1 nay). The
This case has not yet been first presented to
final resolution
the internal management committee; there
was completely
are conflicts of interest to be avoided and
different from
the original financial situation and
the opinion
conditions since the issuance of preferred
expressed by
shares has changed. The aforementioned
the independent
proposal is not equitable to individual
director (TWSE
shareholders; an opinion of dissent has been ID6).
(2)
After
expressed against this case.
thorough
discussion, the
proposal passed
the board at a
ratio of 6:5 (all
eleven board
members were
present, 6 ayes
and 5 nays).
The final
resolution was
completely
different from
the opinion
expressed by
the independent
director (TWSE
ID6).
[Reservation]
Please reference the written issues of 27
APR 2017 raised by supervisor B,
especially that concerning a more detailed
audit of the subsidiary(s).

(TWSE
16)

27
APR
2017

(TWSE ID22) March 2017 audit report
by Audit Office.

(TWSE
17)

12
MAY
2017

(TWSE
ID23)*

(TWSE
16)

23
MAY
2017

(TWSE ID22) April 2017 audit report by [Reservation]
Audit Office.
According to this specialized report, suggest
a review of the details regarding the
accounts receivable and build-up of
inventory in the subsidiary.
(TWSE ID12) On the re-appointment of [Veto]
directors & supervisors in More than 75% of the company’s assets are
Subsidiary R.
accounted for by company R, therefore the
seating of directors and supervisors for both

(TWSE 9) 08
JUN
2017

On the matter of Company [Reservation]
chairman C being a
consultant to the
subsidiary.
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companies should correspond; object to reappointment.
Subsidiary R should
[Veto]
combine the land of the
There is no reason to prohibit a parent
adjacent company and
company to supervise or manage the matter
jointly develop it.
of handling the development of assets of the
100% owned subsidiary; request for the
subsidiary to provide all relevant
information, such as comparison of pros and
cons to the board for understanding and
discussion. If the board were, today, to
make a resolution that the board cannot
supervise or manage such matter, I cannot
agree.
Plan to keep the scheduled [Veto]
agenda for the 16 JUN
Recommended to cancel the proposal to
2017 shareholders
revise the Articles of Incorporation through
meeting and the special
a shareholders proposal in the shareholders
preferred shareholders
meetings, and suggest a more appropriate
meeting.
solution that meets with the approval of
authorities; and, also propose that during the
vote to pay attention to the avoidance of
conflicts of interest.

(TWSE 5) 15
JUN
2017

(TWSE ID6)

(TWSE
14)

(TWSE ID20) On continued investment
Laos.

19
JUN
2017

(TWSE 9) 30
JUN
2017

[Vol. 15

(1) Disparity exists between the company’s
business and this investment in land and
property.
(2) Investment in the assets of company T
has not yet gone through the process of
evaluation.
(3) No feasibility analysis for this
investment project; opportunities and risks
are not clear.
(TWSE ID12) Extemporary motion from [Veto]
the 22nd term’s first board Company R is a 100% wholly-owned
meeting is null and void; subsidiary of the company and set up
convening of special
essentially as a proxy for holding the parent
board meeting on the
company’s land assets. In substance it is
matter of replacing
more than a mere specialized real estate
company R’s directors & development company with its main
supervisors.
business activities having to do with the

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss1/7
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss1/1

the Law.

After thorough
discussion, the
resolution passed
on a 6:5 vote (all
11 members of
the board were
present with 6
ayes and 5 nays).
The final
resolution was
completely
different from the
opinion
expressed by the
independent
director (TWSE
ID6).
Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

2019]
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(TWSE
18)

14
JUL
2017

(TWSE
ID24)*
(TWSE
ID25)*

Discussions about
company T shareholder
advances in subsidiary
company S receivables.

(TWSE
13)

25
JUL
2017

(TWSE
ID26) 65
(Remuneration
Committee)

Deliberations on 2016
compensation allocations
for directors and
supervisors.

(TWSE
19)

07
AUG
2017

(TWSE
ID27)*

2016 Q2 consolidated
financial statements.

65

management and employment of profits
from its land assets. Company R is, in fact,
an important part of the company’s division
for asset management; and, as such, in
compliance with the principles of corporate
governance, it should be under the
supervision and direction of the company
and should not escape the board of
directors’ scope of authority. Having the
same members of directors and supervisors
in both parent company and its subsidiary
was consistent with the principles of
corporate governance, but from the point of
view of replacements, the legality and
legitimacy is, in fact, difficult to make out;
so, I cannot agree with such replacement.
[Veto]
(1) Relevant Personnel should avoid
conflicts of interest so as to avoid giving
rise to losses due to inappropriate acts.
(2) This case has been going on for as long
as ten years, and relevant data is probably
incomplete. Recommend that the company
immediately secure the materials and
appoint a specialist to handle the matter.
(3) Recommend for the company to proceed
per board resolution and immediately
appoint an attorney and send the relevant
materials to an investigative body, so as to
protect the interests of shareholders.
[Reservation]
Significant difference between proposed
director & supervisor compensation and that
of the previous year; recommend
assessment and adjustment.

Handled per the
board’s resolution
and material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law; date
chosen for the
convening of the
remuneration
committee.
[Reservation]
Material
Expressed reservations about some of the
information
item explanations in the financial
published in
statements, the relevant departments should accordance with
attach supplementary explanations
the Law.
following the meeting.

Not an independent director of (TWSE 13) at the time the opinion was posted.
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42
(TWSE
20)

09
AUG
2017

(TWSE
ID28)*
(TWSE
ID29)*
(TWSE
ID30)*

(TWSE
14)

14
AUG
2017

(TWSE ID20)

(TWSE 9) 13
SEP
2017

(TWSE ID12)

(TWSE
21)

20
OCT
2017

(TWSE ID31)

(TWSE
22)

07
NOV
2017

(TWSE
ID32)*

(TWSE
19)

09
NOV
2017

(TWSE ID27)

(TWSE 9) 10
NOV
2017

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

On the matter of company [Veto]
U’s NT$220 million loan. Audit Committee: (TWSE ID28) opposed.
Board: (TWSE ID28) opposed.
[Reservation]
Audit Committee and the Board: (TWSE
ID29), (TWSE ID30) expressed that they
could agree to the loan only after the
borrower, i.e. Company U, had agreed to
supplemental conditions.
Plans for continued
(1) Investment projects are too
investment in Laos.
concentrated, high level of risk.
(2) No specialized person appointed who
can manage the land investment project and
apprehend local policies on land use and
foreign exchange risk.
(3) Emphasis should be place on the
company’s business and related industrial
development.
Replacement of directors [Veto]
and supervisors in
Recommend that all directors and
Subsidiary company R.
supervisors in the subsidiary should still
match parent company’s directors and
supervisors.
Discharge of bank V
[Veto]
senior vice-president D.
Because the investigatory proceedings took
place in the financial holding company and
I, myself, did not participate therefore
consent cannot be given based on the
company’s one-sided presentation of
documents.
Reinvestment in Company [Veto]
X.
Owing to the present lack of clarity as to
whether the prospective electric cars shall
employ a method of battery replacement or
battery recharge, as well as an unfavorable
outlook for the time being as to the current
prospects for recovery of the company’s
overseas investment funds, therefore
objection is made.
Report of 2017 Q3
[Reservation]
consolidated financial
Keeping the reserved-opinion with respect
statements.
to losses.

(TWSE ID12) Discussions on 2018
budget.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss1/7
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[Vol. 15
Request the
borrower to
submit all
relevant materials
and afterward
convene again for
deliberations.
Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.
Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.
The independent
director’s
dissenting
opinion and its
reasons recorded
in the board
meeting minutes.

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.
[Veto]
Material
Owing to on-site lack of previous years’
information
budgets and actual disparities in
published in
implementation data, determinations cannot accordance with

2019]

(TWSE
23)

10
NOV
2017

(TWSE 9) 04
DEC
2017

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.
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be made, and it is recommended to invite
outside persons to facilitate judgment and
adjustment in order to make improvement.
For this reason, disagree on passing the
budget.
Reconsideration of audit [Reservation]
committee deliberations
The relevant facts of the motion are not
on the proposal of director clear; recommend that explanatory
E.
information be provided.
Extemporary motion on
[Reservation]
the board’s prohibition of Request that the company verify the
private persons making
authenticity and completeness of recorded
recordings.
content; under the condition that directors
have the authority to request the recordings
from the company, I agree not to make
private recordings.
New increase to amount
[Reservation]
of company Y’s loan.
Request that relevant supplementary data be
provided and proposal resubmitted.
New increase to amount
of company Z’s loan.

(TWSE
ID33)*
(TWSE
ID34)*
(TWSE
ID35)*
(TWSE ID12) Reconsideration of the
audit committee’s
submission of material
asset transactions for the
wholly-owned subsidiary.

(TWSE
21)

06
DEC
2017

(TWSE ID31) Transfer of subsidiary
General Manager F.

(TWSE
14)

29
DEC
2017

(TWSE ID20) Plans for continued
investment in Laos.
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[Veto]
(1) Should be handled in compliance with
relevant provisions on related party
transactions.
(2) Recommend that the letter of intent
should be fully disclosed to all directors.
(3) It is inadvisable to exclude any mention
of favorable dealings for any potential
clients; and, the best interests of the
subsidiary should be taken into
consideration. Recommend that the content
of letters of intent to purchase from a
potential client be sent to the subsidiary.
[Veto]
General Manager F should not be
transferred; doubts remain as to the
qualifications of the replacement candidate.
Object for these reasons.
The company’s long-term funds are not
sufficient and there is not specified
department to handle it.

the Law.

Once the material
has been
prepared,
proposal to be
resubmitted.
Material
information
published per
director request.

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.
Entered into the
minutes of the
board meeting.
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TPEx-listed Companies
Year

Company Date

Subject

Incident & Causes

2013

(TPEX1)

21
JAN
2013

(TPEX ID1)*

Decision on whether to
formally hire newly
appointed General
Manager G.

Company
Response and
Action(s) Taken
[Veto]
Director H to act
Newly appointed GM G’s inability to
as interim general
persuade the entire board on the operational manager.
plans for the new business unit and the
necessary funds will create additional
operational burdens for the company. Object
to the formal hiring of GM G.

(TPEX2)

07
AUG
2013

(TPEX ID2)
(TPEX ID3)
(TPEX ID4)*

Discussions on bank A’
consolidated credit limit
application;
supplementary conditions
require two guarantors.

[Veto]
With respect to bank A’ application for
consolidated credit limit, request the finance
department undertake further investigations
and discussions with the bank.

(TPEX3)

16 SEP (TPEX ID5)*
2013
(TPEX ID6)
(TPEX ID7) 66
(Remuneration
Committee)
26
(TPEX ID8)
DEC
(TPEX ID9)
(TPEX
2013
ID10)* 67
01
(TPEX ID8)
AUG (TPEX ID9)
2014
(TPEX ID10)

Adjustments to
comparison chart on staff
salaries.

[Reservation]

FY2014 budget: prepared
forecast of losses in
consideration of industry
changes.
Proposed increase of 2.2%
to employee base salaries
from 01 AUG 2014.

[Veto]
Object to the company’s prepared forecast
of losses.

(TPEX4)

2014

(TPEX4)

Reason

Budget passed on
a 6:5 final vote of
the 11 directors
present.
Three IDs advocated that salary adjustments Proposed salary
should be considered along with a change to adjustments
the salary system from a fixed scale to a
passed on a 6:5
percentage increase of salary.
vote of the 11
directors present.

(TPEX ID5), (TPEX ID6) and (TPEX ID7) were not independent directors of
(TPEX3) at the time the opinion was posted (according to the 2013 Annual Report for
(TPEX3) the company had not yet set up independent directors).
67 As of the cut-off time for data preparation (7/28/2018), according to material
information published on the MOPS, (TPEX ID10) was elected as an independent director
of (TPEX4) on 26 JUN 2018, and has yet to revise the information registered with the
MOEA.
66
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Request for the
finance
department to
initiate further
investigations
and discussions
with Bank A’.

2019]

2015

2016
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(TPEX5)

12
AUG
2014

(TPEX ID11) The first transfer of shares
(TPEXID12)* of 2014 to employees
(TPEX
through share repurchases.
ID13) 68
(Remuneration
Committee)

[Veto]
The entire remuneration committee
considered it better to wait for an improved
transfer system and more favorable timing
to make such a proposal; this proposal
should be postponed for the time being.

(TPEX4)

20
MAR
2015

(TPEX ID10)

[Veto]
Comprehensive discussions could not take
place due to the absence of 4 directors (2
IDs).

Passed on vote of
a majority of
directors, 6
present, 5 in
favor and 1 ID
against.

(TPEX6)

24
MAR
2015

(TPEX ID14)

[Veto]
Donations should benefit company
operations and be based on the principle of
raising the corporate image.

(TPEX7)

21
MAR
2016

(TPEX ID15)
(TPEX ID16)

Entered into
reporting items
for shareholders
meeting at the
request of the
independent
director.

(TPEX8)

04
MAY
2016

(TPEX ID17)
(TPEX ID18)

(TPEX7)

01
JUL
2016

(TPEX ID19)

(TPEX7)

21
JUL
2016

(TPEX ID19)

The company did not
participate in the 2014
subsidiary plans for a
capital increase in the
form of cash and NT$10.6
per share for 24.61 million
share transfer to company
B’.
Plan for NT$2 million
donation to University C’
building fund.

Planned private placement [Veto]
of common shares.
Current company funds sufficient and the
placement amount too high; threatens the
interests of current shareholders.
Upon the completion of
[Veto]
the tender offer for
The tender offer has yet to be fully
company D’, the entire
implemented.
board should undergo reelection.
Shareholder request to file [Veto]
a lawsuit against the
The matter is not an urgent item and there is
representative supervisor a problem with the notice to convene.
of company E’ (juristic
Request to deal with the matter on the basis
person) for damages and of corporate law and reconvene.
apply to the court for
provisional injunction.
Changes to the place for
[Reservation]
the 2nd special
shareholders meeting of
2016 and dissemination
of souvenir gifts.

68 (TPEX

ID11) and (TPEX ID12) were both independent directors of (TPEX5) at the
time of posting the opinion; only (TPEX ID13) was not an independent director of (TPEX5)
at the time of posting.
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(TPEX7)
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02
AUG
2016

(TPEX ID19)

CEO appointment.

[Veto]

09
SEP
2016

(TPEX ID19)

Cancellation of noncompete restrictions for
managers.
Election of board chair.

[Veto]

(TPEX9)

18
SEP
2016

(TPEX ID20)* Appointment of finance
department assistant
manager.

(TPEX9)

20
SEP
2016

(TPEX ID20)

(TPEX9)

25
OCT
2016

(TPEX ID20)

(TPEX9)

01
NOV
2016

(TPEX ID20)

(TPEX7)

07
NOV

(TPEX ID19)

(TPEX7)

[Vol. 15

Appointment of GM.
CEO adjustment.
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[Veto]
No material attached as to assistant manager
educational background and experience;
extreme asymmetry of information.

(1) “Appointment
of finance
department
assistant
manager,” doubt
Extemporary motion “to
Changing the corporate seal is a major issue as to there being
no procedural
change the company seal.” and cannot be done as an extemporary
injustice. In the
motion; abstain from voting.
future, the
procedural rules
of the board
should be
examined.
(2) Per attorney,
“changing the
company seal” is
not a major issue.
Convening of first special [Veto]
Per attorney: the
shareholders meeting.
Company plan for holding special
special
shareholders meeting on 04 NOV 2016.
shareholders
Time should match that of supervisor’s
meeting
convened first special shareholders meeting convened by
of 2016.
supervisor is
against the law.
Planned issue price and
[Veto]
All present
other relevant details for
Written objection.
directors passed
the second private
the resolution
placement of common
without dissent.
shares in 2015.
Extension and change to
[Veto]
All present
the payment period and
Written objection.
directors passed
date of record for capital
the resolution
increase through the
without dissent.
second private placement
of common shares in
2015.
On the company and
current management
[Veto]

2019]
2016

(TPEX7)

10
NOV
2016

(TPEX ID19)

10
NOV
2016
(TPEX10) 13
MAR
2017

(TPEX ID19)

(TPEX11) 28
APR
2017

(TPEX ID22)

(TPEX11) 11
MAY
2017

(TPEX ID22)

(TPEX7)
2017

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.
team’s receipt of false
accusations and request to
the board to authorize the
Chair to proceed with
relevant measures to
litigate.
Planned investment to
construct solar power
generation facility.

Pursuit of compensation
from former Chair.

(TPEX ID21)* Distribution of 2016
surplus earnings.

Review of independent
director qualifications.
Review of proposals
raised by holders of more
than 1% of the company’s
issued stock.
Planned 2nd domestic issue
of secured convertible
corporate bonds.

47

No clear opponent; dissent expressed.

[Veto]
(1) No detailed explanation of the factory
location.
(2) The company does not have personnel
with relevant expertise in solar power
plants.
(3) Request clarification on reasons for this
contractor and record of past performance.
(4) Is there approved bank financing?
(5) What guarantees are there against solar
panel degradation?
[Veto]
Support request for compensation; only note
that it is outside the authority of the board.
[Veto]
The company should take into account the
future outlook and market vicissitudes;
recommend per share dividends be reduced
from NT$2.0 to NT$1.0 and cash dividends
be increased from NT$0.5 to NT$1.0.

[Reservation]

[Veto]
The roll-out of the company’s first issue of
debt has yet to be completed, there has been
no demonstrable increase in the company’s
business performance, and the level of
relevant internal controls have yet to be
clearly audited; oppose this item.
Invitation for legal advisor [Veto]
to attend the 07 JUN 2017 Relevant information about the attorney as
shareholders meeting.
well as the content of service has not yet
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Chair to reply in
writing.

Surplus earning
distributions
revised on the
basis of the
independent
director’s
recommendation;
all present
directors passed
the revision
without dissent.

48
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Appoint law firm X to
handle the provisional
injunction for all civil
claims by the person I’ et.
al.
Planned buy-back of
company issued stock.

(TPEX12) 11
MAY
2017

(TPEX ID23)
(TPEX ID24)

(TPEX13) 21
JUN
2017

(TPEX ID25)* Planned handling of the
exchangeable bond due
date of company F’.

(TPEX14) 10
AUG
2017

(TPEX ID26)* On subsidiary company
(TPEX ID27)* G’s attaining distributor
(TPEX ID28)* agreement for company
H’s limited edition electric
car.

Subsidiary company G’’s
planned loan from Bank
I’.

(TPEX15) 20
SEP
2017

(TPEX ID29)

(TPEX16) 13
NOV
2017

(TPEX ID30)* Increase to subsidiary’s
(TPEX ID31)* capital in the form of cash
(TPEX ID32)* to secure rights for
cellphone game
development.
(TPEX ID33)* Convening of special
board meeting to discuss
holding of special

(TPEX17) 11
DEC
2017
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[Vol. 15

been provided.
[Veto]
Relevant information about the attorney as
well as the content of service has not yet
been provided.
[Veto]
In consideration of the challenges in the
company’s industry and a comparatively
high ratio of debt, recommend the use of
other means to incentivize employees.
Company F’ is untrustworthy; recommend
to immediately assert the breach to the due
date for debt exchange as a means to
resolve the issue of repayment.
[Reservation]
Should wait for the completed content of
the distribution agreement of subsidiary
company G’ with company H’ and legal
signing, and then after the company adjusts
the content of its distribution contract with
company G’ based on the aforementioned
distribution contract, re-deliberate.

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.
Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

Because of its links to the aforementioned
motion, this case should be deliberated
together in the next board meeting.

Hong Kong subsidiary
[Veto]
increase of capital through Capital increase should be raised internally.
public markets.
Supervisor remuneration [Veto]
In consideration of company finances.

Request for supplemental data.

[Veto]
(1) Seven-day notice period not met;
violation of Article 204 of the Company

Discussion
postponed on the
two motions; and,
material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.
Hold another
audit committee
and board
meeting to
discuss.
Material
information
published in

2019]
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shareholders meeting for
the purpose of protecting
company benefits and
shareholder interests.
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Act.
(2) Violation of requirements for TPEx
electronic information postings.
(3) Per the authority of an independent
director, I, myself, announced on the 6th of
December the convening of a special
shareholders meeting.
Discussions on reporting [Veto]
violations of the Ethical
(1) Independent director (TPEX ID34) is
Corporate Management
chief counsel of firm K’ and firm K’ has
Best Practice Principles.
provided legal opinions about the legality of
the company’s correction to the ex-right
trading date. (TPEX ID34) clearly does not
meet the qualifications of an independent
director and chair of the audit committee.
(2) Company management has on several
occasions prevented myself (TPEX ID33)
from exercising my supervisory rights as an
independent director.
Fourth term of 3rd audit
The referenced case is being litigated and
committee meeting
has no bearing on the motion being
dissenting opinion of
discussed, entering it into the meeting
independent director.
minutes would not be appropriate.
Concerning discussions on [Veto]
reporting violations of the The law already empowers independent
Ethical Corporate
directors with the right to exercise their
Management Best Practice duties; there is no need for further
Principles, the setting up discussion on this matter.
of the investigatory
process and dates.

(TPEX17) 16
DEC
2017

(TPEX ID33)

(TPEX17) 29
DEC
2017

(TPEX ID34)

(TPEX17) 29
DEC
2017

(TPEX ID33)

(TPEX18) 29
DEC
2017

(TPEX ID35)* 2018 annual budget.
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accordance with
the Law.

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

Material
information
published in
accordance with
the Law.

[Veto]
Material
Target(s) should be set according to the EPS information
0.5 reported at last board meeting.
published in
accordance with
the Law.
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ESB-traded Companies
Year

Company Date

Subject

2014

(ES 1)

13
MAR
2014

2015

(ES 2)

10
MAR
2015

(ES ID1) 69
Remuneration committee
(Remuneration member ES ID1’s review
committee)
of the company’s bonus
system.
(ES ID2)*
Integration of the
company’s business units
and lean organizational
management.

(ES 3)

11
AUG
2015

(ES 4)

09
DEC
2015

(ES 5)

14
MAR
2016

(ES 5)

25
MAR
2016

2016

Incident & Causes

(ES ID3)
(ES ID4)* 70
(Remuneration
committee)

Director, supervisor, and
member of functional
committees travel expense
to attend shareholders
meeting.
(ES ID5)
Newly hired vice
(ES ID6)* 71
president of research &
(Remuneration development department,
Committee)
special assistant to the
office of the chairperson,
and 2016 annual salary
adjustment review for key
managers.
(ES ID7)
2016 annual budget.

(ES ID8)*

Coordinating the audit
committee’s set-up for
revisions to some parts of
the Articles of
Incorporation.

Reason
[Reservation]

[Veto]
The current company organization structure
has complementarity with product
development and there is no present need to
consolidate product lines.
[Reservation]

[Veto]
Wait for the company to provide the salary
range chart and all other relevant
documents for further study and comment.

[Reservation]
Request that bimonthly audit reports be
made as budget progress reports for the
board.
[Veto]
Carrying out the set-up of the audit
committee without sufficient discussion is
not advisable.

(ES ID1) was an independent director of (ES 1) at the time of positing the opinion.
(ES ID4) was an independent director of (ES 3) at the time of posting the opinion;
only (ES ID3) was not an independent director of the company at the time of posting. As
of the cut-off time for data preparation (7/28/2018), (ES ID4) was still an independent
director of (ES 3) according to the registration information of the MOEA.
71 (ES ID5) and (ES ID6) were both independent directors of (ES 4) at the time of
posting the opinion. As of the cut-off time for data preparation (7/28/2018), (ES ID6) was
still an independent director of (ES 4) according to the registration information of the
MOEA.
69
70
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Company
Response and
Action(s) Taken

2019]
(ES 6)
2017
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10
AUG
2016
08
JUN
2017

(ES ID9)*

Office expansion.

[Reservation]

(ES ID10)*

[Reservation]
Request the finance department to assess
the financial situation and the percentage of
sales before further discussions.

(ES 8)

09
AUG
2017

(ES ID11)*

Authorizing the board
chair to handle the
television and movie
investments, each within a
limit of NT$30 million.
Commission agreement.

(ES 9) 72

01
DEC
2017

(ES ID12)
(ES ID13)

(ES 7)

Audit committee planned
capital loan of US$4.5
million for second-tier
subsidiary company M.

[Reservation]
Re-open discussion after adding
explanatory supplemental materials to
commission agreements.
[Reservation]

On March 27th, 2018, (ES 9) announced the termination of its over-the-counter
trading in the Emerging Stock Board, and all independent directors had resigned prior to
the termination of its ESB trading.
72
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After adjusted by
board to
USD$2.5 million
passed with over
2/3 agreement of
entire board.

